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STATE GIFT TAXES-THEIR RELATION
TO DEATH TAXES*
HENRY BRANDIS, JR.**
BACKGROUND or STATE GiFT TAXES
Revival of the federal gift tax in, 19321 has been followed by wide-
spread consideration of state gift taxes and adoption of such taxes in
nine states-Oregon and Wisconsin in 1933, Virginia in 1934, Colorado,
Minnesota and North Carolina in 1937, California and Tennessee in
1939, and Louisiana in 1940.2 This compares with forty-seven states
having death taxes, Nevada being the sole exception.3
It is generally conceded that the federal tax was the result of: (1)
the belief that such a tax was necessary to prevent wholesale avoidance
of death taxes by gift inter vivos, or at least to recoup part of the death
tax revenue so lost; and (2) the belief that it was necessary to prevent
substantial income surtax losses through the inter vivos distribution of
large estates. The latter reason seems to have been stressed less in
1932 than in connection with the enactment of the first federal gift
tax in 1924.4
If these are sound reasons they have been sound since the federal
and state governments began to levy death taxes and graduated income
taxes, though the need for the gift tax becomes more apparent and
more acute as increasing death and surtax rates put an increasing pre-
mium on discovery of tax free methods of distribution; and this is true
whether the legislative purpose be to raise revenue or to force the
* This article originally appeared in the IowA LAw REviEw for March, 1941,
as a part of a "Symposium on State Inheritance and Estate Taxation". It is
reprinted here by permission of the editors of the IowA LAW RsviEw.-Ed.
.** Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'For the current version of the federal tax, see Int. Rev. Code, §§1000-1031,
as amended, primarily as to rates, by the First Revenue Act of 1940.
'The current versions of the state gift tax laws are as follows: Calif. Laws
1939, c. 652, amended Laws 1940, c. 41; Colo. Laws 1937, c. 161, amended Laws
1939, c. 111; La. Acts 1940, No. 149; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940)
§§2394-71-84; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§7880(156)ee-nn; ORE. CODE
ANN. (Supp. 1935) §§69-1601-1628, amended Laws 1937, c. 250; Tenn. Acts
1939, c. 137; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx CoDE §§120(1)-(15); Wis.
Laws 1933, c. 363, amended Laws 1933, c. 450, Laws 1935, c. 35, Laws 1937, cc. 32,
263, 302, 306-8, Laws First Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 14, Laws 1939, c. 412. The Wis-
consin tax is still designated as an emergency tax and will, unless re-enacted,
expire on July 1, 1941.
For a commentary on the 1937 version of the North Carolina law, see (1938)
16 N. C. L. REv. 194.
8For a summary of the development of American transfer taxes, including
gift taxes adopted prior to 1935, see Sullivan, The Development of Transfer Taxes
it; the United States in the Twentieth Century (1935) 13 TA.x MAG. 389.
" Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation (1940) 18 TAXEs 531.
See also Magill, The Federal Gift Tax (1940) 40 COL. L. Rnv. 773.
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break-up of large estates (the latter being an objective, incidentally,
which, if ever attained, will lead to reduction in, surtax revenues which
no gift tax can recoup).
States which have no graduated personal net income taxes lack at
least one of the major motives for a gift tax; and it is probably of some
significance that, of the gift tax states, only Tennessee falls in this cate-
gory. It seems probable, however, that death tax motives have been
the controlling ones in bringing forth the state gift taxes so far enacted.5
Legislatures in other states may have felt that the process of using the
taxing power to break up estates has progressed to a point beyond which
the states should not carry it; that gift taxes might disadvantage them in
competing for wealthy residents; and that, in view of the comparatively
small portion of total state tax revenues produced by death taxes,6
further shrinkage to be anticipated as a result of the present situation,
as outlined below, will create no alarming fiscal condition. Neverthe-
less, the slow but steady increase in the number of gift tax states is
probably due to continue.
COMPARATIVE COST TO THE TAXPAYER AND COMPARATIVE
REVENUE TO THE STATES
In the average situation, so far as federal taxes alone are concerned,
it is clearly cheaper to give away property inter vivos than to die with
it, for the following main reasons: (1) The gift tax rates are only three-
fourths of estate taxy rates.7 (2) The estate tax must be paid out of
the estate taxed, while the donor can use other funds to pay the gift
tax-funds not serving to increase the amount of the taxable gift. (3)
The gift tax provides, in addition to the same $40,000 specific exemp-
tion as the estate tax, annual exemptions of $4,000 to each donee except
as to gifts in trust and gifts of future interests.8 (4) Since each tax
has its separate exemptions, and since each begins at a low rate and
increases progressively, the first gifts made are exempt or taxable at
the lowest gift tax r-ates, whereas if the property were retained until
See, for instance, Jacobs, The Gift Tax Act of 1939 and Recent Inheritance
Tax Legislation (1940) 15 THE STATE BAR J. (Calif.) 193, 195.
'Statistics given in (1940) 4 TAX ADmMsTaAToRs NEws 85 show that death
.and gift taxes produced 3.5% of total state tax revenue in 1937 and 1939 and
2.9% in 1940. Figures in (1940) 7 Tax Policy No. 10, p. 4, showing, by states,
the average percentage of total tax revenue derived from death and gift taxes
for 1936-9, indicate a range from 8.2% in New Jersey to 0 in Nevada, with 42
states belbw 5% and 33 below 3%. Wisconsin, standing 10th with 4.3%, was
the top jft tax state, being preceded, in the order named, by New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Florida, Maryland
and New Hampshire. The other gift tax states stood: Colorado-13th with 3.1%;
California-16th with 2.9%; North Carolina-19th with 2.6%; Oregon-21st
with 2.5%; Tennessee-23rd with 2.4%; Minnesota-27th with 1.8%; Virginia-
29th with 1.5%; Louisiana-33rd with .9%.
SINT. REV. CODE §§810, 935, 1001, amended Pub. L. No. 656, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. (June 25, 1940) §§206-7. 8 INT. REv. CoDE §§1003-4.
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death it would then, in effect (because added to all other property of
the decedent), be taxed at the rate applicable in the highest bracket
reached by estates of the particular size.9
It is quite clear that Congress realized it was favoring gifts, but
preferred reduced revenue at an earlier date;1o and, had it been origi-
nally uninformed, the existence of the favoritism has now certainly
been amply publicized. 1 While the situation is not so bad as it would
have been had Congress attempted to levy the present high death duties
without a complementary gift tax, it is still clear that the federal
differential may encourage gifts to the extent of eliminating a sub-
stantial percentage of state death tax revenue, whether the amount in
dollars be great or small; and it is also clear that any state which, with-
out levying a gift tax, levies a death tax which may exceed the 807
credit allowed against the federal tax, is increasing the differential
in favor of gifts. To what extent, then, have the gift tax states nulli-
fied this advantage?
In the first place, only Minnesotal2 has fixed gift tax rates at three-
fourths of death tax rates.13 Excepting Oregon, the others have the
same basic gift and death tax rates, though Colorado has tacked an
additional 10% on inheritance taxes, apparently inapplicable to gift
taxes,' 4 and Wisconsin has a possibly inadvertent difference in rates
as to one class of beneficiaries. 15 In all of these states the gift tax
follows the state's inheritance tax plan of classifying beneficiaries in
accordance with relationship to the donor and computing the tax ac-
cordingly. In Oregon the gift tax rates are based on total gifts to all
donees and comparison with the death tax is difficult, because the latter
(while legally an inheritance tax in toto) consists of one set of rates
based on the entire estate plus additional rates on the shares of all
Conversely (also because of the separate exemptions and rate schedules) it
is possible for gift tax rates to reach a point at which it would be cheaper to
retain remaining property until death; and this would be true wherever total
remaining estate has dropped below the estate tax exemption, assuming that any
gift tax at all would be payable on further gifts.
" Harriss, supra note 4 at 536.
"See, for instance: WINSLOW, MINIMIZING DEATH TAXES (3rd ed. 1939)
cc. X-XV; Magill, supra note 4 at 776; Magill, Federal Regulation of Family
Settlements (1937) 4 U. OF CHr. L. Ray. 265; Becker and Becker, Saving Shrink-
age in Estates by Giving (1940) 18 TAXES 555; Boye, Advantages and Disad-
,:vantages in Making Gifts (1935) 13 TAX MAG. 699; Hughes, Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes (1938) 16 TAx MAG. 446.2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §§2293, 2394-76. Actually, because of
limitations on maximum over-all rate applying to both taxes, the three-fourths
ratio would not always be preserved.
18 "Death tax" as applied to state taxes in this article means, unless the con-
text otherwise indicates, the basic plan of death taxation, not including the special
estate tax which may be levied to take up the 80% federal credit, if the basic
tax would be less, by all the states involved except Oregon.11 CLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 119, §29.
15 Wis. STAT. (1935) §72.02-3, amended Laws 1939, c. 111; Laws 1933, c. 363,
§4, amended Laws 1937, c. 306, Laws First Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 14.
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except Class A beneficiaries. 16 The gift rates seem to be higher than
,death tax rates on gifts made to those closest to the donor (i.e., those
who would be his Class A beneficiaries if the donor died) and, at least
where substantial amounts are involved, lower on gifts to other donees.
On the whole, then, the, state comparative rate picture is less favor-
able to gifts than is the federal, particularly because, when interest loss
due to earlier payment is considered, a gift tax rate which equals the
death tax rate is, in reality, higher.' 7 Further, if the donee dies shortly
after receiving a taxable gift, his federal estate tax may be credited with
the gift tax,' 8 while no state has extended, this type of provision, com-
mon with respect to successive death taxes, to apply to gift taxes. All
the states except Wisconsin have followed the federal law in making
the donor primarily liable and the donee only secondarily liable, thus
clearly sanctioning payment of the tax from other funds. Originally
Wisconsin made the donee alone liable,19 and it was held that if the
donor paid the tax it constituted an additional gift.2o However, since
1937, the donor is secondarily liable,21 and it has not yet been decided
whether the additional gift doctrine still prevails.
Simple rate comparisons are misleading. North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia and Wisconsin have omitted the cumulative feature
of the federal law. They tax each year's gifts separately (except for
exemption carry-overs in North Carolina and Wisconsin), instead of
determining the rate applicable to the particular year's gifts by adding
them to total gifts for prior years since adoption of the law. This
makes no difference in an unrealistic comparison of death taxes with
gift taxes due if the entire estate were given away in one year; but in
the more likely case in which gifts cover several years, beginning at the
lowest rate each year makes the gift tax much cheaper though nomi-
nally the rates are the same.
In Virginia 22 annual exemptions equal, and in Tennessee2" they
exceed, the death tax exemptions. In Wisconsin the specific exemp-
tion, to be taken once, approximates the death tax exemption, and there
is an annual exemption of $1,000 per donee.24 North Carolina allows
'o ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §§10-603, 69-1602.
' For the mathematics of this, see Winslow, supra note 11 at 81.
18 INT. Rav. CODE §812(c). This should not be confused with the credit pro-
vided against the tax on the estate of the donor.
" Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363, §4(7).
"0 Boyd v. Department of Taxation, Wis. Board of Tax Appeals, Aug. 9, 1940,
C. C. H. Inb., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 19227.21Wis. Laws 1937, c. 307. Even if the doctrine still prevails, the tax paid
would presumably be a gift only in the year following the original gift, when
the return is due; and, if this is the case, since the Wisconsin tax is not cumula-
tive, the effect would not be the same as requiring that the tax be paid out of
the gift taxed.
"
2VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx CoDE §§98, 120(1).
'TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1937) §1266; Acts 1939, c. 137, §4.
' Wis. STAT. (1935) §72.04, aviended Laws 1939, c. 311; Laws 1937, c. 308.
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a total of $25,000 to Class A donees (equivalent to the death tax
exemption for a widow and three minor children), plus exemption for
gifts of $1,000 or less to any donee in any year.25 As for the cumulative
states, specific exemptions in all equal the inheritance tax exemptions,
and there are annual exemptions ranging from $500 in Louisiana to
$5,000 (to Class A beneficiaries) in Oregon. 20 The state annual exemp-
tions average below the federal exemption (which was once $5,000),27
but no state now denies the exemption to gifts in trust2s and Louisiana,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin do not deny it to
gifts of future interests.2 9
. In summary, state laws as a group seem to encourage gifts by per-
mitting property presumably withdrawn from the high. death tax brackets
to be taxed in the low gift brackets; by permitting use of other funds,
not included in the taxable amount of the gift, to pay the tax; and by
granting substantial annual exemptions. To farsighted donors, the non-
cumulative states seem to have given additional encouragement, though
comparative rates on gifts in the other states, except Minnesota, are
less favorable than the federal rates.
However, the giver of gifts cannofl evaluate his total blessings sim-
ply by adding the state and federal favors, even assuming that each is
capable of precise mathematical determination-an assumption which,
in view of the number of unknowns involved is obviously incorrect.
The reason is, of course, that there is an overlap between the estate and
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§7880(3), 7880(156)ee.
28 CALiF. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, and Laws 1939, c. 652, §§24,
28-9, amended Laws 1940, c. 41; Colo. Laws 1939, c. 111, §§4-5, and c. 118, §1;
LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §8556, and Acts 1940, No. 149, §§4, 7; MiNx.
STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §§2293, 2394-73, 2394-74; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp.
1935) §§10-603, 69-1604-5, anmended Laws 1937, c. 250.7 See INT. REv. CODE §1003(b) (1).
Calif. Laws 1939, c. 652, §29, denied the exemption to gifts in trust, but this
was changed by Laws 1940, c. 41.
Prior to 1938 the federal law did not deny the exemption to gifts in trust and
controversy ensued as to whether there should be one exemption for the trust or
one for each beneficiary, with the latter theory having, so far, the upper hand.
Welch v. Davidson, 102 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939); Rheinstrom v. Com-
missioner, 105 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); McBrier v. Commissioner, 108
F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) ; Commissioner v. Hutchings, 111 F. (2d) 229
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. granted 61 Sup. Ct. 73 (1940) ; Early v. Reid, 112 F.(2d) 718 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; United States v. Pelzer, 31 F. Supp. 770 (Ct. Cl.
1940), cert. granted 61 Sup. Ct. 65 (1940). Contra: United States v. Ryerson,
114 F. (2) 150 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), reversed on another point 61 S. Ct. 479
(1941).
Under Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rules 31 and 113, it appears that the
beneficiary of a trust is regarded as the donee; and such was also the holding in
In re Fink, Wis. Tax Commission, Dec. 8, 1938, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift
Tax Serv. 8049. The Minnesota Court, in State v. Probate Court. 101 Minn.
485, 112 N. W. 878 (1907), dealing with a similar problem as to inheritance taxes,
reached the same conclusion as the majority of the federal cases cited above.
2For definitions of "future interest" see U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 11, and
Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 28; cf. Silbert, Volntary Trusts and Fed-
eral Taxation (1937) 17 B. U. L. REv. 1, 27.
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federal death taxes to the extent of the 80%o credit, while there is no
such credit and, consequently, no such overlap in the gift taxes. There-
fore, the combined comparison is between: (1) total gift taxes, state
and federal, at full statutory rates; and (2) federal death taxes at full
rates plus that part of the state death tax, if any, which exceeds the
80%o credit. If, as would ordinarily be the case, the state gift tax is
greater than the amount by which the state death tax would exceed the
80%o credit, then the inter vivos gift is less attractive than if the state
had neither gift nor death taxes. And, perhaps not infrequently, total
federal and state gift taxes actually -payable on a specified sum may
exceed total death taxes payable on the same sum, presenting the anom-
alous spectacle of adding two savings to produce a loss; though the
privilege of paying the taxes from other funds, anticipated income tax
savings and numerous other factors, both pecuniary and sentimental,
might still influence the taxpayer in favor of the gift. In some cases,
however, the differential in favor of the death tax might be so sub-
stantial as to be controlling. Facts can vary so infinitely that it is
difficult if not impossible to generalize.
In the main it seems that Congress, in offering tax bargains to
inteil vivos gifts, has done so to a very large extent at the expense of
the states. Yet no state can undertake to protect its dieath tax revenue
without making gifts much less attractive and thus, in effect, running
counter to congressional policy. What the eventual result will be defies
current prediction. The most obvious possibility, for which increasing
sentiment may be anticipated, at least among the gift tax states, is a gift
tax credit comparable to the death tax credit, though seventeen billion
dollar spending programs have at least a slight tendency to darken pros-
pects for any action potentially involving reduction in federal revenue.
The outcome may eventually depend upon the fate of the suggestion, sub-
sequently mentioned briefly, that gift and death taxes be more completely
integrated and made, in effect, one tax. At any rate, any changes in
policy must wait upon legislative changes; and it is to be hoped that
this will be regarded not as an isolated problem, but merely as one
phase of the problem of coordinating overlapping tax systems, solution
of which could conceivably render the credit question academic by
allocating administration of, if not all revenues from, transfer taxes to
one level of government.3 0 If a credit provision were adopted it would
dearly tend to force adoption of state gift taxes; but such coercion
'0 It is clearly impossible here to treat adequately this complex subject which,
in recent years, has called for so much research, discussion and exposition-all
with such meager concrete results. For brief commentaries on the various possi-
bilities, see Hall, The Coordination and Integration of Federal, State, and Local
Tax Systemsr (1935) 10 WASH. L. REv. 22; Magill, The Ciordination of State
and Federal Taxes (1937) 15 TAx MAG. 187.
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should be no more abhorrent to the Constitution (and the Supreme
Court) than the death tax credit.3 '
Primarily protective measures, state gift taxes were probably no-
where expected to be major revenue producers. If fulfillment of this
negative expectation is their true measure of accomplishment, the
taxes have been a howling success. Collection figures8 2 may be sum-
marized as follows:
Death Tax G*t Tax Per Cent of
Revenue Revenue Total Produced
State Years (in Thousands) (in Thousands) by Gift Tax
California ............. 1940 $10,530 $ 208 2
Minnesota ............ 1939 1,691 140 8
North Carolina ........ 1938-40 3,887 155 4
Oregon ............... 1935-9 2,919 445 13
Tennessee ............. 1940 854 5 1
Virginia .............. 1935-40 3,805 483 11
Wisconsin ............ 1936-9 14,868 1,519 9
Totals ............. $38,554 $2,955 7
Perhaps the Tennessee and California figures should be eliminated
because, while in each case a full fiscal year elapsed after adoption of
the tax, the annual return system means that less than a year's gifts
were included. However, the gift tax in the other states produced
only 9% of total transfer tax revenue. By comparison, the federal
government, for the period 1933 through 1939, collected $1,489,000,000
in death taxes and $333,000,000 in gift taxes,33 the gift tax constituting
18% of the total or twice the average for the states. This apparently
tends t6 confirm the thesis that state gift taxes may discourage inter
vivos giving, at least by comparison with the situation in other states,
though discouragement to the point of abandonment is certainly not
indicated. However, there are numerous other factors to be considered
and, further, the collection figures obviously do not represent as yet
an experience record which would justify anything other than the most
tentative conclusions.
OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
All the state taxes are apparently intended to be excise or privilege
taxes on transfers by gift, even though the North Carolina and Vir-
"-Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927).
", For the information as to collections, grateful acknowledgment is made to
the following: Floyd Clouse, Chief Accounting Officer, California State Control-
ler's Office; Franklin B. Stevens, Director Inheritance and Gift Tax Division,
Minnesota Department of Taxation; R. L. Ward, Jr., Chief, Division of Accounts,
North Carolina Department of Revenue; E. G. Sanders, Auditor, Oregon Treas-
ury Department; Newt Cannon, Jr., Senior Examiner, Inheritance Tax Unit,
Tennessee Department of Taxation and Finance; Jesse W. Dillon, Supervisor of
Inheritance Taxes, Virginia Department of Taxation; Neil Conway, Inheritance
Tax Counsel, Wisconsin Department of Taxation. The Wisconsin death tax
figures represent the state's 92/20% of total collections.3 Rep. Sec'y. Treas. (1939) 375; U. S. Budget for 1941, p. A 3.
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ginia statutes, in terms, tax "the shares of the respective beneficiaries." '3 4
Though the language varies, all the statutes expressly provide that if
property is transferred for less than adequate consideration, the differ-
ence between the value of the property and the consideration is a taxable
gift. Some expressly exclude bad bargains from this provision by
requiring donative intent ;35 but the same result should clearly be reached
without the express requirement. 36 The California regulations3 7 and
the Oregon return form probably represent the prevailing view when
they negative, as adequate consideration, such items as love and affec-
tion, promises of marriage, and release of inchoate dower.38 The Wis-
consin statute uniquely exempts reasonable gifts made for the "current
maintenance, support or education" of a dependent ;39 though the same
result might follow elsewhere to the extent that "gifts" serve only to
fulfill a legal obligation to support.
The Minnesota and Wisconsin laws seem definitely to contemplate
that corporate gifts shall be taxable. However, they also provide that
payments by employers (corporate or otherwise) shall be exempt when
made for various specified employee benefits. 40 This departs from the
federal statute, which taxes transfers by "any individual," whether
"direct or indirect". 41 Most of the other state laws are little more
specific as to corporate gifts than the federal law, though several tax
the transfers of "persons" and define "persons' to include corporations
unless the context otherwise indicates.42 However, the federal authori-
ties have deduced that a corporate gift is a gift by the stockholders, 43
and California in its regulations44 and Oregon in its return form indi-
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(156)ee; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1936) TAX CoDE §120(1). Beth statutes, however, also refer to the "passage"
of property as the thing to which the tax applies.
" Calif. Laws 1939, c. 652, §36; Colo. Laws 1937, c. 161, §7, amended Laws,
1939, c. 111; La. Acts 1940, No. 149, §2; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940)
§2394-72.
36 See Magill, supra note 4 at 778. See, also, holding consideration inadequate
and the excess taxable, In re Connor, Wis. Tax Commission, July 17, 1939,
C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 8279.
'
7 Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 112.
Cf. H-Iusman v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert.
denied 309 U. S. 656, 60 Sup. Ct. 469, 84 L. ed. 1005 (1940) ; B. B. Bristol, 42
B. T. A. 263 (1940) ; John P. Archbold, 42 B. T. A. 453 (1940).
For more detailed treatment of the consideration problem, see Note (1938)
51 HARv. L. Rav. 533. With specific reference to divorce settlements and alimony
trusts, see Magill, supra note 4 at 790; Hines, Tax Aspects of Property Settle-
ment Agreements (1939) 12 So. CALIF. L. REv. 386, 388, Paul, Five Years with
Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HARV. L. Rv. 1.
In this connection the income tax cases concerned with what constitutes a gift
may be of importance. See note (1938) 22 MINN. L. Rrv. 539.
"Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363, §4(6), amended Laws 1937, c. 308.
" MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2394-71; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363,§§4(6)-(7), amended Laws 1937, cc. 307-8.
"'INT. Ray. CODE §1000. "'See, e.g., La. Acts 1940, No. 149, §1.
'
3 U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(1).
"Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 110.
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cate that they are sufficiently impressed to follow this lead. To prevent
circumvention of the tax by use of closely held corporations some such
policy seems appropriate and in accord with legislative intent. On
the other hand, it is very doubtful that most legislative bodies contem-
plated that gifts by ordinary business corporations, not closely held,
should be regarded as taxable gifts from the stockholders to the donees.
Perhaps, though, the gap between legislative intent and administrative
construction in these situations is more apparent than real, because the
annual exception allowed for gifts froni each stockholder-donor to each
donee would, except in unusual cases, be more than enough to prevent
tax liability. However, in those states whose laws expressly include
gifts by corporations, the corporation would apparently be the donor
and entitled to one annual exemption only per &onee. In the only state
case reported, Wisconsin taxed as gifts the amounts by which a closely
held corporation reduced mortgages owed by sons of the principal
stockholders, apparently treating the corporation as the donor.46 The
converse situation of gifts to corporations does not seem to have been
passed upon by any state.4 6
The state laws, like the federal, are silent with respect to gifts by
minors and incompetents. However, the California authorities, no
doubt with an eye to juvenile earning capacity in Hollywood, have pro-
vided rather elaborately: that payment of the earnings of an emancipated
child to parents he is not legally obligated to support is a taxable gift;
that, except for sums reasonably necessary for maintenance, payment
to him, in trust or otherwise, of an unemancipated child's earnings
is a taxable gift from the parents (this flawless product of pure legal
reasoning the writer finds a little hard to take); and that transfers
to parents by emancipated minors or adult children, when the latter
are legally obligated to support the former, are not taxable gifts
except to. the extent that they exceed the amount reasonably necessary
for maintenance.4r The time the gift takes place is not specified, but
the implication is that it takes place when the transfer first occurs. On
the other hand, the idea of the federal courts has been that the gift is
taxable when the erstwhile minor neglects to disaffirm after coming of
age,4 8 though it is none too clear just how long such neglect must
continue.
The federal courts have held, as to incompetents, that transfers of
"' Wallrich v. Department of Taxation (2 cases), Wis. Board of Tax Appeals,
July 26, 1940, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 19206-7.
,Cf. Frank B. Thompson, 42 B. T. A. 121 (1940); (1940) 50 YALE L. J.
335.
' Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 117.
48 Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939), cert. denied
309 U. S. 680, 60 Sup. Ct. 718, 84 L. ed. 1023 (1940) ; (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv.
690; (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 631.
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the incompetent's funds authorized by court order, if for maintenance of
dependents are not taxable gifts, being in discharge of legal obliga-
tions; but that payments not in discharge of such obligations are tax-
able.49 Substantially the same rule has been adopted in the California
regulations, o but the other states seem not to have committed them-
selves as yet.
Charitable and similar exemptions evince the usual legislative ten-
'dency to suggest that legitimate generosity stops at the state line. Only
Tennessee places no geographical limitations on such exemptions,"'
though the Oregon and Virginia provisions are broad enough to cover
most gifts to the organized foreign benighted, 52 and the Minnesota
provision is also fairly liberal.53 At the other extreme are Colorado,
Louisiana and Wisconsin, exempting only gifts to institutions within
or for use within the state, 54 while California and North Carolina occupy
the center with reciprocal provisions. 6 The gift tax exemptions are
substantially the same as death tax exemptions, the chief exceptions
being Minnesota, where the death tix exemptions require use of the
bequest within the state,56 and Oregon, where the death tax exemption
is reciprocal. 5
Except in Wisconsin no gift tax case has reached a state court of
last resort. In the Wisconsin case the taxpayer attacked the consti-
tutional power to levy a graduated gift tax, and the court must have
passed upon it, since it found in favor of the tax, but little, if any,
attention is devoted to this phase of the taxpayer's contention in the
opinion.68 In the other states the question of constitutionality is techni-
cally open, but there is little reason to anticipate unfavorable decisions.
In support of constitutionality there is the obvious analogy to the death
tax; there is the Supreme Court's decision that the federal gift tax
is constitutional and is not a property tax (which might find trouble
lurking in a state uniformity clause) ;r9 and there is the existing levy,
" City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey, 101 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939);
Alice H. Lester, 41 B. T. A. 515 (1940).
"' Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 118.
"Tenn. Acts 1939, c. 137, §3.
a ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §69-1605, amended Laws 1937, c. 250; VA.
CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAX CODE §120(1), amended Laws 1940, c. 118.
" MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2394-73.
" Colo. Laws 1937, c. 161, §4, amended Laws, 1939, c. 111; La. Acts 1940,
No. 149, §3; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363, §4(5), amended Laws 1937, c. 302.
5 Calif. Laws 1939, c. 652, §23 (see also Rules and Reg., Rules 150-162);
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(156)ee. The North Carolina provision,
which is peculiarly worded, may exempt without reference to reciprocity.
"MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2293.
"ORE. COD- ANN. (1930) §10-601, amended Laws 1939, c. 148.
"Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 235 Wis. 128, 292 N. W. 313
(1940), aff'd per curiam 61 Sup. Ct. 36 (1940).
" Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46, 74 L. ed. 226 (1929);
(1930) 28 MICH. L. REv. 778. See also (1926) 39 HAxv. L. Rnv. 888.
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by eight of the nine states, of graduated net income taxes. In fact,
the very dearth of case material indicates the general resignation of
taxpayers and attorneys to the constitutionality of the tax, at least in
those states adopting it in 1937 or earlier, when there has been adequate
time for the question to be brought before the appellate courts.
Retroactivity, which furnished the only serious constitutional trouble
encountered by the federal tax,60 is expressly negatived in all the state
laws. No appellate court has yet passed upon the validity of a state
gift tax on state br federal securities, but the federal courts have already
indicated they will follow the death tax rules and allow a federal gift
tax,61 and the states will undoubtedly also be free to reach the same
results. 62 Constitutional problems involving jurisdiction will be men-
tioned briefly at a later point.
TRANSFERS INTER VIvos-GIFT TAX OR DEATH TAX OR BOTH?
Once it is conceded that a death tax can apply to inter vivos trans-
fers, it is necessary to classify those transfers which are subject, re-
spectively, to gift tax only, death tax only, and both. Crystal clear
statutory answers are rare. Therefore, in view of the almost phe-
nomenal lack of state case material, little can be done in the way of
positive delineation of the state situation. Such administrative action as
the writer has been able to discover can be pointed out. Federal authori-
ties will be stressed in the belief that, despite theoretical differences as
to the taxable event between federal estate and state inheritance taxes,
they will receive respectful consideration if not universal acceptance.
However, as will be apparent, the state of the federal law is often none
too clear; and the situation under state laws may be said, therefore, to
be doubly uncertain.
Every state except Oregon has followed the federal lead in allowing
a gift tax credit on the death tax when property on which a gift tax was
paid is thereafter included in the donor's estate. The Oregon law pro-
vides flatly that no transfer subject to inheritance tax shall be subject to
gift tax,63 and emphasizes the literal meaning of the words by providing
" Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 72 L. ed. 645 (1928).
See also Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105, 72 L. ed. 206 (1928),
commented on (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 944; ef. Milliken v. United States, 283
U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. ed. 809 (1931).
61 Phipps v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937), cert. denied
302 U. S. 742, 58 Sup. Ct. 144, 82 L. ed. 574 (1937), commented on in (1938)
12 TULANE L. Rgv. 319 and (B. T. A. version) (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV.
123; Hamersley v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 768 (Ct. Cl. 1936), cert. denied
300 U. S. 659, 57 Sup. Ct. 435, 81 L. ed. 868 (1937), petition for rehearing denied
302 U. S. 774, 58 Sup. Ct. 132, 82 L. ed. 600 (1937), commented on in (1937)
50 HARv. L. REv. 840.
6 See Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 111, stating that the tax applies
to gifts of federal, state and local bonds. Several of the return forms carry
instructions to the same effect.
"
2OR. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §69-1601.
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no credit. The Wisconsin law contains a similar provision, but it is
incongruously coupled in the same sentence with a credit provision, 4
and both obviously cannot be entitled to literal application. The Tennes-
see law contains a much vaguer provision to the effect that it does not
repeal or modify the death tax, but the two shall be construed as, "in
pari nzateriz".6 5 Against this background we consider, necessarily very
briefly, some typical situations in which overlap problems are certain to
arise.
1. Transfers in Contemplation of Death
A gift is ordinarily none the less absolute when made because made
in contemplation of death, and such gifts seem clearly to fall under the
language of the gift tax statutes. Under the federal law the Supreme
Court seems to have conceded that this is one situation (possibly the
only one) in which both gift and death taxes will apply.6 In view of
this and of the fact that a contrary construction would render the credit
provisions virtually meaningless, all the states except Oregon are likely
to enforce the gift tax here, even though all of them tax such transfers
also at death. 7 Faced with the statutory exclusion provision mentioned
above, Oregon authorities have specified on the gift tax return form
that gifts in contemplation of death should be reported with a statement
of the motive to show that the gift tax does not apply. Conceding that
this is binding on the taxpayer, would acceptance of gift tax be equally
binding on the authorities and prevent later inclusion of the property
in gross estate? Difficulties of proof and decision being what they are,
as long as death tax laws include such transfers, it seems administra-
tively much more desirable to recognize an overlap than to attempt to
classify each gift as soon as made, particularly when death tax statutes
include presumptions covering the period immediately prior to death,
the effect of which can be determined only on a hindsight basis.
2. Retention of Control Powers by the Donor
The laws of California, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Ten-
nessee and Virginia clearly provide that creation of a revocable trust is
not taxable, but that the relinquishment of the revocation power, other
than by death, is a taxable gift ;8 and at least one other state, Colorado,
"'Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363, §4(1). " Tenn. Acts 1939, c. 137, §21.
o" Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 Sup. Ct. 51, 84 L. ed.
20 (1939).
20 CALIF. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §2(3) -(4) ; COLO. STAT. ANN.(1935) c. 85, §7; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§8556, 8573; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, Supp. 1940) §2292; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1); Ore.
Laws 1939, c. 148; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1937) §1260; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1936) TAx CODE §98; WIs. STAT. (1935) §72.01(3).
' Calif. Laws 1939, c. 652, §37, amended Laws 1940, c. 41; MINN. STAT.(Mason, Supp. 1940) §2394-71; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(156)ee;
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has reached the same position by administrative construction. 9 Under
the 1924 federal statute the Supreme Court reached the same conclu-
sion without benefit of an express provision, in Burnet v. Guggen-
heim.70 That, for practical tax purposes, a gift is incomplete until made
irrevocable is almost unquestionably a correct concept.
However, tax cases have a way of becoming more complicated. If a
taxpayer creates a trust, later relinquishes his revocation power, and
still later relinquishes a separately -reserved power to change the bene-
ficiaries in any way not involving designation of himself or his estate,
when does the gift take place? In Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner7l
and Rasquin v. Humphreys2 the Court selected the last-mentioned
time. The decisions rested primarily on the belief that Congress didn't
intend that gifts not in contemplation of death should be subject to
both gift and estate taxes, and retention until death of the power to
change beneficiaries would clearly make the property taxable at death.
7 3
A secondary reason was that the donee might become liable for gift
tax and it would be unfair to him if he were deprived of the property
after having paid the tax. The federal regulations have now been re-
vised to attempt to follow these decisions. 74
It is likely, of course, that some states will follow this lead. How-
ever, there are at least three reasons why a state might reach a different
result. (1) A court in one of the states with the statutes providing that
relinquishment of a power of revocation is a taxable gift might hesitate
to say that the legislature would have decreed differently had it contem-
plated the case in hand. The Supreme Court has not yet had to pass
on this question squarely. All these state statutes stem from section
501 (c) of the federal Revenue Act of 1932, but, as pointed out in the
Humphreys case, that section was repealed in 1934 because it was
thought that Burnet v. Guggenheim rendered it unnecessary. It seems
improbable, however, that had it been in force, it would have changed
Oam. CoDE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §69-1601; Tenn. Acts 1939, c. 137, §2; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx CoDE §120(1).
" Explanation of Colorado law by the Attorney General and Inheritance Tax
Commissioner, reported in C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv., Colo., 12600.
"0288 U. S. 280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369, 77 L. ed. 748 (1933). Accord: Means v.
United States, 39 F. (2d) 748 (Ct. Cl. 1930), cert. denied 282 U. S. 849, 51 Sup.
Ct. 28, 75 L. ed. 753 (1930) ; cf. Orrin G. Wood, 40 B. T. A. 905 (1939)
11308 U. S. 39, 60 Sup. Ct. 51, 84 L. ed. 20 (1939).
.308 U. S. 54, 60 Sup. Ct. 60, 84 L. ed. 77 (1939). See also Hesslein v. Hocy,
91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied 302 U. S. 756, 58 Sup. Ct. 284,
82 L. ed. 585 (1937) For comments on these cases and the Sanford case, see(1938) 23 CORN. L. 6. 464; (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rxv. 995; (1938) 32 I.. L.
Rxv. 890; (1940) 38 MicH. L. REV. 566; (1940) 18 Tax. L. Rax. 238; (1938) 5
U. OF Cur. L. REv. 521.
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 Sup. Ct. 451, 77 L. ed. 880 (1933).7U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 3, as amended by T. D. 5010, approved Sept. 19,
1940.
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the result of the Sanford and Humphreys cases, as a regulation with
virtually the same provisions was ineffective to prevent that result.7 5
(2) The -death tax law of the particular state may not cover trusts
where less than a full power of revocation is reserved.76 (3) A state
court may feel that the general provisions of the gift tax taxing trans-
fers of property require a tax in this situation, regardless of what the
court's views may be about the undesirability of overlapping gift and
death taxes. Nothing 'definitely indicating the attitude of the states has
been found except in California; and the considerations just mentioned
have left administrative authorities there peculiarly unimpressed, as
they have indicated in their regulations that the Sanford case will be
followed. 77
A further complicating factor arises when the power is reserved to
the donor and others rather than to the donor alone. Most of the state
laws refer expressly to powers reserved to the 'donor alone or to the
donor in conjunction with any one not having a substantial adverse
interest. This language also came from old federal section 501(c), and
the federal regulations still carry substantially the same provision.78
The obvious implication is that if the other person has a substantial
adverse interest, the creation of the trust is a taxable gift. If, as under
the present federal law,7 9 cohtinued existence of such power until the
death of the settlor will result in inclusion of the trust property in gross
estate, then there is an overlap of the sort the Supreme Court appar-
ently disapproves. Nevertheless, the highest federal authority to date
indicates that such an overlap will occur.80 What the state answer to
' Cf. Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
" The state statutes are, in the main, even less specific than the federal law as
to the powers which, if reserved, will result in taxation at death. For example,
the Louisiana law contains no provision regarding reserved powers; the North
Carolina law, N. C. .CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1), refers to reservation
of a power of revocation or a right to designate the persons who will enjoy the
property or income, but makes no mention of powers held in conjunction with
others; the Virginia law, VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx CODE §98, mentions
reservation of the right to change the beneficiaries, but also omits mention ofjointly held powers; and the Tennessee law, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1937)
§1262, refers to powers of revocation, alteratiofn or amendment upon exercise of
whichl the property woidd revert to the settlor.
v, Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 113.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 3, as amended by T. D. 5010, approved Sept. 19,
1940. " INT. R.v. CODE §811(d).
" Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). The actual
decision was that when jointly held powers, created in 1931, were released in
1935, the release was non-taxable when the person sharing the power with the
settlor had a substantial adverse interest and taxable otherwise. The result was
that, as to the substantial adverse interest situation, the trust, escaped both gift
and death taxes since, for gift tax purposes, it was treated as complete prior to
enactment of the law, and it was withdrawn from the purview of the estate
tax law by release of the power (unless the original transfer or the release ,was
in contemplation of death). However, at p. 337, the opinion seems to concede
that, as to future cases, an overlap might be possible-i.e., the gift would be
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the problem will be is largely unpredictable, particularly since the state
statutes are neither identical nor clear on the question of death tax
liability when the reserved powers of the deceased are shared by
others.81
The state statutes dealing expressly with reserved powers of revo-
cation, still following old section 501 (c), provide that when income from
a trust subject to such powers is paid to a beneficiary other than the
donor, it is a taxable gift. Though the Board of Tax Appeals has held
to the contrary,8 2 there is no sound reason why the states should follow
the decision, at least until it has been approved by more advanced mem-
bers of the judicial hierarchy. Express statutory provision is the only
reason which need be assigned, though the Board's decision seems er-
roneous even without the statute.
There are other problems, in reserved power situations, involving
relationship between gift and death taxes and gift and income taxes ;83
but, even if space limitations permitted their discussion here, there is
little, if anything, in the way of authority to indicate the probable
developments in the states. The only thing inevitable is that the inter-
relation of the three taxes will call for considerably more study by
legislative bodies, state and federal, and rore definitely expressed leg-
islative policies than have yet been forthcoming.
3. Reversions and "Possibilities of Reverter"
The present position of the United States Supreme Court, as ex-
pressed in Helvering v. Hallock,84 is that when the settlor of a trust or
grantor of an estate would retake the property if the beneficiaries or
donees predecease him, then, regardless of the particular property law
theory of the reversion, the transfer is a taxable event for death tax
purposes when he predeceases them. The high courts of Oregon 8 and
Colorado 6 have reached the same result; and, since the result depends
not upon specific statutory description of the transfer, but rather upon
the general and common language taxing transfers "intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death," some, if not all,
complete and taxable when the trust is created and, if the power is not thereafter
surrendered inter sivos the property will necessarily be included in gross estate
because, of the continued existence of the power. Contra: First National Bank v.
United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N. D. Ala. 1939).
81 See statutes cited, supra note 76.
"Giles W. Mead, 41 B. T. A. 424 (1940) ; Jack L. Warner, 42 B. T. A. 954(1940). See criticism by Magill, supra note 4 at 785.
S See Magill, supra note 4 at 780; Sutter and Owen, Federal Taxation of
Settlors of Trusts (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REv. 1169; Tremper, Single and Mltiple
Trusts-Some Observations (1939) 17 TAXES 463.8 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. ed. 604 (1940).
" li re Lowengart's Estate, 160 Ore. 118, 84 P. (2d) 105 (1938).
8" Milliken v. People, 102 P. (24) 901 (Colo. 1940).
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of the other gift tax states may be expected to hold likewise when
opportunity arises. Should such transfers also be subject to gift taxes
in the light of the mutual exclusion implications of the Sanford case?
Before attempting to answer, it is necessary to define more precisely,
if possible, what is taxed at death. There are three main possibilities:
(1) the entire value of the property; (2) the value of the property,
excluding the value of outstanding life estates; and (3) the value of
the contingent interest retained by the decedent. This third alternative,
while not without support,87 should probably be rejected offhand be-
cause, at the date of death, as a practical matter it has no value and
there is no authority for valuing it at the date of the original gift or
any other time. Of the remaining two, the Colorado court, with two
judges dissenting, chose the first, while in the Oregon case it was con-
ceded by all hands that the second was the proper rule. The language
of the Hallock decision seems to point to the first, but the history of the
litigation there involved rather indicates the second.,8
When it is recalled that if a grantor gives only a life estate, retain-
ing a reversion, only the value of the reversion subject to the life
estate will be included in gross estate if the grantor predeceases
the life tenant, the second alternative above seems clearly the proper
one when the remainder which depends upon the longevity of the life
tenant is held by some one other than that tenant. Such is the rule
clearly adopted by the current federal regulation s9 and such were the
facts involved in the Oregon case. More difficult is the situation in
which only one donee is involved and the gift is not, in express terms,
divided into life estate and remainder. Such was substantially the situa-
tion in the Colorado case. The federal regulation does not seem to
cover this expressly, though if it contains any implications they favor
the second alternative. In view of the fact that the least which is taken
by the donee absolutely, prior to the death of the donor, is a life estate,
this second alternative seems preferable.
If death and gift taxes are to be mutually exclusive, then the uncer-
tainty as to death tax liability creates a corresponding uncertainty as to
gift tax liability; and, even if some overlapping is to be permitted here,
there is still a question as to what part of the property value is a taxable
gift. Here, again, there are three main alternatives: (1) the entire
value; (2) value of a life estate in the donee, plus the value of the
contingent remainder (or entire value less value of donor's "possi-
bility") ; and (3) value of the life estate only.
17 Everett, Valtlion of a "Possibility of Reverter" under the Hallock Case
(1940) 18 TAXEs 611. "' Everett, supra note 87.
8 U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 17, as amended by T. D. 5008, approved Sept. 19,
1940. Accord: Bradlee v. White, 31 F. Supp. 569 (D. Mass. 1940).
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Since the Sanford and Hallock cases the Board of Tax Appeals has
held a gift subject to a possibility of reverter nontaxable, 90 and if this
is followed no choice of alternatives will have to be made. However,
the possibility that something less than the entire fee might be taxed
was conceded, though, because the case had not been argued on that
theory and there was nothing in the record as to the value of any such
lesser estate, no attempt was made to pass on it. At most, then, the
case is authority for rejection of the first alternative above. A very
recent Board case may indicate that the value of a life estate is taxable,
thus adopting the third alternative.91
The only state whose authorities seem to have committed themselves
on the point is California, where the regulations term such a transfer
a taxable gift, the tax to be computed as if the transfer were made
subject to a contingency.92 This means that the tax may be computed
on the assumption that the events producing the greatest tax will tran-
spire, with privilege of refund in the light of actual developments; or
that payment may be postponed upon filing of proper bond; or that a
compromise figure may be agreed upon as a final discharge.
93
Without attempting to predict what developments will be,94 it at
least may be said that: (a) If the mutual exclusion doctrine is to be
followed, then the most logical course is to tax the life estate value as
a gift and the remainder value upon death (or when relinquished);
and the gift tax paid on the life estate would not be a credit on the
estate tax. (b) The Sanford case does not require such a result, because
the contingency in this situation is not under the control of the donor-
"Marrs and Verna Hooks McLean, 41 B. T. A. 1276 (1940).
For prior cases see Hughes v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939) (contingent reversionary interest in settlor might prevent entire value of
corpus from being taxed as gift, but burden was on taxpayer to show what value
of the interest was) ; John S. Mack, 39 B. T. A. 220 (1939) ; William T. Walker,
40 B. T. A. 762 (1939).
" Margaret W. Marshall, 43 B. T. A., Dec. 17, 1940. The writer has seen
only a reference to this case and has had no opportunity to examine the opinion.
See also Emery M. H. Norweb, 41 B. T. A. 179 (1940), decided after the
Sanford case, holding that where taxpayer created a revocable trust, with her
,husband as life tenant, and later released all power to change the trust in any
way inimical to the husband during his life, and still later transferred additional
property to the trust, this latter transfer was a taxable gift to the extent of the
husband's life interest in the property transferred.
92 Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 113. The same Rule follows the doc-
trilie of the Sanford case on the facts involved therein, clearly indicating that
the California authorities perceive a difference between the two situations. See
also Rule 91.
" Calif. Laws 1939, c. 652, §§64-71, amended Laws 1940, c. 41. See also Gift
Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 325. Several of the other gift tax laws have this type
of provision as to contingencies; but they do not. refer expressly to possibilities
of reverter, and there are no administrative regulations dealing with the matter
comparable to those in California.
" For discussion of the possibilities from the standpoint of the federal tax,
see Magill, supra note 4 at 787.
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i.e., while relinquishment can enlarge the donee's interest, no voluntary
act of the donor can defeat it. And if the mutual exclusion doctrine is
not to be followed, then, in the absence of a statute expressly dealing
with valuation of contingencies, the most logical alternative is the sec-
ond one above (taxation of the life estate plus the contingent remain-
der). As of the date of the gift it most closely conforms to what is
actually given; though it may discourage this type of transfer, not only
because it subjects it, in part at least, to both taxes, but also because
it may result, if the initial donee predeceases the donor, in taxing bene-
fits never actually received. (Of course, to a lesser degree, taxing a
life estate on an expectancy basis may have the same result.) (c) The
California method, which is a logical and possibly a required one in
states having a statute of the California type concerning contingent
gifts, will result, wherever the donor predeceases the donee, in taxing
the entire property, thus causing the maximum overlap if the death tax
also applies to such transfers. However, the provisions dealing with
refunds and deferment offer opportunity to prevent gift taxation of
non-existent benefits should the donee first die.
4. Life Estate Reserved to the Donor
The statutes of at least four of the gift tax states,9 5 in common with
the federal law,0 6 provide that reservation of a life estate will subject
the transfer to death tax; and at least three of the others have reached
the same result by court decision.97 Under the mutual exclusion idea,
if strictly followed (as it presumably would be in Oregon), the gift of
the remainder would not be subject to gift tax when made, even though
irrevocable. Nevertheless, the federal rule, before and after the Sanford
case, seems to have resulted in levying the gift tax,98 though there is a
11 CALIF. GEN. LA .S (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §2(3)-(4) ; COLO. STAT. ANN.
(1935) c. 85, §7; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1); VA. CODE ANN.(Michie, 1936) TAX CODE §98.
"INT. Rav. CODE §811(c). See Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297, 58 Sup.
Ct. 565, 82 L. ed. 852 (1938).
"7 Rising's Estate v. State ex rel. Benson, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N. W. 459 (1932);
In re Wallace's Estate, 131 Ore. 597, 282 Pac. 760 (1929) ; In re Schranck's Es-
tate, 202 Wis. 107, 230 N. W. 691 (1930); Waite v. Tax Commission, 208 Wis.
307, 242 N. W. 173 (1932) ; In re Ogden's Estate, 209 Wis. 162, 244 N. W. 571(1932) ; cf. In re Hhmilton's Estate, 217 Wis. 491, 259 N. W. 433 (1935).
" This is the logical meaning, as applied to this point, of U. S. Treas. Reg.
79, Art. 3, both before and after its amendment by T. D. 5010, approved Sept. 19,
1940. And see: Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 8th,(1939) (when taxpayer reserved 40% of income for life, putting another 10% in
fund from which trustees in their discretion could make payments to her, she
was allowed to deduct from the total value of the property, for gift tax purposes,
the value of the reserved interest in the 40% but not in the 10%o of the income) ;
Martin Beck, 43 B. T. A., Dec. 20, 1940 (when the taxpayer created a funded life
insurance trust, with remainder over, he was allowed to deduct from the value of
the corpus, for gift tax purposes, the present value of the income required to
pay the insurance premiums, this being regarded as the equivalent of a reseryed
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curious absence of direct authority on the point. 9 The California regu-
lations also provide that the remainder is taxable as a gift. 00
On the other hand two Attorneys General have ruled to the con-
trary, 01 thus giving possibly over-zealous approval to the general im-
plications of the Guggenheim and Sanford cases. Presumably, under
this view, if the life estate were relinquished inter 'uvos the entire value
of the property would then be taxable as a gift.
To the writer, viewing this split of state "authority," it seems that,
because an irrevocable gift of a remainder is clearly a gift of property
having a present value, the California position more closely follows the
provisions of the statutes.
5. Joint Estates weith Survivorship Rights
All the gift tax statutes, state and federal, are silent on the creation
of joint bank accounts, joint tenancies and estates by the entirety-a
silence which, in the light of the death tax troubles which have grown
out of these types of property tenure, is rather hard to understand. The
bank account problem is settled by the federal regulations, 0 2 which
specify that the gift tax attaches when the donee withdraws the monley.
This eminently sensible method of handling a practical problem elimi-
nates all possibility of an overlap with death taxes here unless the with-
drawal can be said to have been permitted in contemplation of death.
All indications are that the states will follow this metho'd,'10 3 except for
Wisconsin, where the Tax Commission ruled that creation of a joint
bank account is a taxable gift of one-half thereof.' 04 What happens if
the donee withdraws more than half the fund is not specified. 10 5
life estate). These cases are not strong authority for continued taxation of
remainders in reserved life estate cases, because the taxpayers seemingly conceded
that the remainders were taxable. However, they illustrate the fact that taxpayers
and the government have had a common understanding on the point.
11 Magill, supra note 4 at 788; (1940) 40 COL. L. Rav. 467, 473; (1938) 32
ILL. L. Rav. 890, 891.
'00 Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 113.
101 C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv., 18165 (North Carolina) and
118179. (Tennessee).
'"
2U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(4).
103 See Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 105; explanation of Colorado law
by Attorney General and Inheritance Tax Commissioner, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and
Gift Tax Serv., Colo., 112600; tax return forms for Minnesota, Oregon and Ten-
nessee. Oregon probably could not tax prior to withdrawal, because funds con-
tributed by the decedent and still in the account at his death are subject to death
tax. Holman v. Mays, 154 Ore. 241, 59 P. (2d) 392 (1936).
104 See the Wis. tax return form.
105 Gift taxation only upon withdrawal may not be wholly satisfactory if the
death tax law includes only one-half the account upon death of the donor, as, in
such a situation, one-half of the excess of the donor's contributions over the
donee's withdrawals would always escape both taxes. However, this cannot be com-
pletely rectified, if it needs rectification, by taxing one-half as a gift upon creation
of the account. The entire fund will then be taxed only if there are no with-
drawals by the donee between the creation of the account and death of the donor.
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As for the joint interests in realty (created by one of the joint
owners) which involve survivorship rights, the federal regulations pro-
vide, in effect, that if either owner can defeat the survivorship by in-
dividual action the creation of the estate is a gift of one-half; but if,
as in an estate by the entireties, neither acting alone can defeat it, crea-
tion of the estate is a gift of (a) the right, if any, of the donee to share
in income or enjoyment during the joint lives, plus (b) the right to
receive the whole in case of survival, the value of both parts to be
determined by the mortality tables'0 6 Clearly, if the donor dies first,
there will be an overlap with the death tax, as the federal estate tax
law provides, in effect, that such jointly held property shall be included
in the gross estate to the extent that it cannot be shown to have been
originally the property of the survivor or procured with his funds. 0
7
On the other hand, if the donee dies first, a gift tax has probably been
collected on more than, as it turned out, was actually given away.
The effect may be to discourage creation of this type of estates.
However, Professor Magill thinks that the regulations will continue to
be the law ;108 and his position is supported not only by the logical
meaning of the statute, but also by the decided cases, the latter including
one in which, long after the Guggenheim case and only a short time
prior to the Sanford case, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari
when the lower court had upheld the gift tax levy.10 9
As usual, there is no state litigation and only scattering administra-
tive enlightenment. California, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee and Vir-
ginia have death tax laws which accord ordinary joint tenancies treat-
ment very similar to that accorded by the federal law, °10 though some
To illustrate: if the donor deposits $10,000, and the donee withdraws $4,000 prior
to death of the donor, gift taxes will have been paid on $5,000 (one-half the origi-
nal deposit) and death tax will be due on $3,000 (one-half the balance remaining)
-a total of four-fifths of the entire fund. Even if the gift taxes are levied on any
excess over one-half the fund withdrawn by the donee during the life of the
donor, the total effect of the two taxes, when some but not all of the fund is
withdrawn prior to the donor's death, will not be to tax the total fund. How-
ever, the difficulty here is not primarily with the gift tax. It is the inescapable
result of the provision taxing one-half at death instead of the decedent's contri-
bution to the fund. A further difficulty with this provision is that, as pointed out
in the text in other connections, it will tax one-half of the fund when the donee
dies first.
"°'U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(7)-(8), 19(8).
'17 INT. REV. CODE §811 (e). - 08 Magill, supra note 4 at 785.
10' Lilly v. Smith, 96 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S.
604, 59 Sup. Ct. 64, 83 L. ed. 383 (1939), notion for rehearing denied 307 U. S.
651, 59 Sup. Ct. 1040, 83 L. ed. 1530 (1939), commented on in (1938) 51 HARV.
L. REv. 1120, (1938) 37 MIcH. L. Rav. 340, (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 71. See
also Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939), commented on(B. T. A. version) in (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1213; Hopkins v. Magruder, 34 F.
Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1940); J. C. Gutman, 41 B. T. A. 816 (1940).
1 0 CALIF. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §2(5); MINN. STAT. (Mason,
Supp. 1940) §2292; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §10-601, amended Laws 1939, c. 148;
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of them exempt tenancies by the entirety. To some extent, at least,
their problem here as to the relation between gift and death taxes is
similar to that of the federal authorities, but it is too early to tell whether
most of them will follow the federal lead. The writer has discovered
nothing to indicate the attitude of Minnesota or Virginia as to how the
gift tax will apply. Tennessee's return form specifies that creation of
a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety is a taxable gift, but it fails
to indicate how the gift would be valued. Oregon's return form indi-
cates substantial adoption of the federal rule as to estates by the entire-
ties, but makes no mention of joint tenancies. This comes about, pre-
sumably, because the inheritance tax law taxes joint tenancies after the
manner of the federal estate tax law, but exempts tenancies by the
entireties, and, as already indicated, Oregon's statute prohibits gift taxa-
tion when there will be a death tax. Finally, California authorities
have decided that upon creation of a joint tenancy, one-half the value of
the property is taxable."'
The problem may be somewhat different in Colorado, North Caro-
lina and Wisconsin, inasmuch as the Colorado and Wisconsin death tax
laws tax one-half the value of tenancies by the entirety and (assuming
two joint tenants) joint tenancies, while the North Carolina statute,
without mentioning joint tenancies, applies the same rule to tenancies by
the entireties.'12 Colorado authorities have indicated that creation of a
joint tenancy is a taxable gift, without indicating to what extent.'18
The Wisconsin return form indicates that creation of a joint tenancy,
including one involving husband and wife, constitutes a taxable gift
of one-half the value of the property. Rulings of the North Carolina
Attorney General seem to indicate that he leans in the same direction.114
When the donor dies first, taxing one-half upon creation of the
estate and one-half upon death prevents an overlap. However, it offers
a discouragement to such transfers possibly even more serious. If the
donee dies first, not only has the gift been overtaxed, but death tax
must be paid on half the property before the donor receives it back.
The wisdom of this is, of course, open to serious question, but the
situation can be corrected only by legislative action. The proper form
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1937) §1261; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx
CODE §98.
... Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 105.
12 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 85, §8; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§7880(1); Wis. STAT. (1935) §72.01(6). In Wisconsin, tenancies of husband
and wife are apparently considered as ordinary joint tenancies. In re Ray's Will,
188 Wis. 180, 205 N. W. 917 (1925).
. Explanation by Attorney General and Inheritance Tax Commissioner, C.
C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv., Colo., 12600. The Colorado statute, in
providing for gift taxes to be credited against death taxes, refers to gift taxes
previously paid on "jointly held property." Colo. Laws 1937, c. 176, §2.
.. Rulings reported C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 18165, 8177.
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for that action to take would seem to be amendment of the death tax
rather than elimination of the gift tax. Meanwhile, the method of
applying the gift tax could probably be changed by administrative ac-
tion. The federal rule, while less certain as a rule of thumb, is likely
to be much more accurate in relation to what is given away. Its adop-
tion by these states could either increase or decrease the possible
hardship when the donee dies first, dependent upon the facts of the
individual case, though the chances probably favor the former in the
majority of cases.
The California gift tax law is the only one to deal expressly with
community property, though Louisiana is also a community property
state." 6 It provides that, whether wife or husband is the donor, the
transfer is a taxable gift of one-half the value of the property; and if
the wife is the donor and predeceases the husband, the second one-half
is then taxed as a gift, without benefit of the annual exemption." 6
Under the death tax law, one-half of community property is taxed upon
the husband's death and none upon the wife's death117 California is
thus in the same position as to community property as is Wisconsin
with respect to joint estates.
As a final word, attention may be called to the essential similarity
between joint estates with survivorship rights and the "possibility of
reverter" situations. In both cases a life interest of some sort is the
minimum gift, ana in both cases the remainder right depends upon a
survival contingency beyond the donor's control. The actual value of
the life interest might vary considerably, dependent upon income and
enjoyment rights in the joint estate cases, but there seems no sound
reason why the two situations should not be governed by the same basic
ideas. It is too early yet to say that they will be.
6. Insurance
No gift tax law, state or federal, provides expressly that gifts of
insurance shall be taxable, though the Colorado statute contains a left-
handed recognition of their taxability." 8 However, the federal regula-
tions currently provide that it is a taxable gift if the insured assigns a
life policy or designates a beneficiary without retaining what amounts
"' See, regarding the Louisiana death tax on community property, In re
Stelly's Estate, 185 So. 637 (La. 1939).
116 Calif. Laws 1940, c. 41; Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rules 80-2, 101-4. Rule
82 provides that conversion of community property into a joint tenancy of the
spouses or 'vice versa does not constitute a taxable gift. For explanation of the
community property provisions, see Jacobs, Administrative Rides and 1940
C'hanges for State Gift Tax Explained (1940) 15 TiE STAx BAR J. (Calif.) 240.
117 CALIF. GEra. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §1 (2).
11. Colo. Laws 1937, c. 176, §2, the provision for credit of gift taxes against
death taxes, refers to gift taxes previously paid on insurance.
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to a power of revocation, or if he pays a premium on a policy already
irrevocably assigned. 19 The right to surrender or cancel or obtain a
loan against the policy, and the right to change the beneficiary if this
latter could be exercised in favor of the insured or his estate or for'
his benefit, are stated as illistrations of "what amounts to a power of
revocation." This expressly denies the application to insurance gifts
of the precise holding of the Sanford case that reservation of a power
to change beneficiaries, even though the donor or his estate could not be
designated, prevents gift taxation, and its validity for that reason may be
doubted, particularly since it is in conflict with the more general pro-
visions of the regulations which follow the Sanford case.1 20 Neverthe-
less, California's gift tax regulations as to insurance substantially follow
the federal regulations, 2 1 even though this creates a similar incon-
sistency, as the regulations elsewhere provide that reservation of a
power of the Sanford case type prevents the creation of a trust from
being a completed gift. 22
Indications are that most of the other gift tax states, if not all, will
attempt to tax irrevocable assignments or designations of beneficiaries
when no legal incidents of ownership are retained and, also, to tax pre-
mium payments by the insured after such assignment or designation.1 2 3
Their attitude toward a reserved power of the Sanford case type has
not been specifically indicated, though the logical meaning of the lan-
guage used, except possibly in Oregon, would be that it rendered the
gift incomplete.
The latest insurance move of the federal authorities is to amend the
estate tax regulations to provide that, to the extent the insured pays the
premiums, all policies payable to named beneficiaries are includible in
gross estate if taken out after January 10, 1941, whether the insured
retained any incidents of ownership or not.12 4 This, except for the date
mentioned, is already the rule specified by statute in California, Minne-
... U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(5)-(6). The taxability as a gift of an irre-
vocable assignment of insurance policies (without reduction in value because of
payment of premiums from Texas community funds, though the assignment was
to insured's wife) was upheld in Blaffer v. Commissioner, 103 F. (2d) 489
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939), rehearing denied 103 F. (2d) 1007 (1939), cert. denied 308
U. S. 559. 60 Sup. Ct. 91, 84 L. ed. 469 (1939).
120 U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 3, as amended by T. D. 5010, approved Sept. 19,
1940.
'2 Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 114.
I2 Calif. Gift Tax Rules and Reg., Rule 113.
12 See explanation of Colorado law by Attorney General and Inheritance Tax
Commissioner, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv., Colo., 12600. See also
return forms for Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee and Wisconsin, and ruling of the
North Carolina Attorney General, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 119101.
1' U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 25-7, as amended by T. D. 5032, approved Jan.
10, 1941. Contrast these new regulations with the recommendations of the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Section of Taxation (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 835.
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sota and, probably, North Carolina. 125 Assuming the validity of this
system for taxing insurance at death, 126 then under the broad implica-
tions of the Sanford case, would virtually all gifts of insurance, even
though irrevocable, be relieved of gift tax? Without more express leg-
islative direction to that effect than has yet been supplied, it is very
doubtful that such a result should be reached, particularly since there
would be no overlap to the extent that all the death tax statutes of the
governments in this group provide some special exemption for insurance
payable to named beneficiaries, 27 while the gift tax statutes provide
none.
1 28
At the other extreme stand Oregon, where the death tax law ex-
pressly exempts insurance payable to named beneficiaries other than the
estate, 129 and Louisiana and Virginia, where the Same result seems to
be reached under laws which do not mention insurance.8 0 Certainly in
these states there is unlikely to be any overlap between gift and death
taxes, though there may be some question raised about taxing as a gift
somthing which the legislature favors strongly enough to exempt com-
pletely from death taxes. (The contrast is more startling here than in
the states in which the insurance death tax exemption is in a specified
sum.)
The death tax statutes of the other gift tax states tax policies pay-
"' CALIF. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §2(9) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason,
Supp. 1940) §2292, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(11), as construed by
ruling of the Attorney General, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 8563.
... In the first two versions of Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct.
CI. 1939) and 30 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. C. 1939), it was held that insurance could
be taxed at death, even though the insured retained no incidents of ownership,
except to the extent that the beneficiary paid the premiums. These opinions were
superseded by the opinion in the third version of the case, 31 F. Supp. 778 (Ct.
CI. 1940), petition for certiorari dismissed by agreeient, 60 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1940),
which proceeded on another ground. For comments at various stages of this
peculiar litigation, see Friedland, The Bailey Case (1939) 17 TAXES 512; (1940)
53 HARV. L. REv. 1208; (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 126; cf. cases cited infra note 132,
and Industrial Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 220, 56 Sup. Ct. 182, 80
L. ed. 191 (1935).
" INT. REV. CODE §811(g) ($40,000); CALIF. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937)
Act 8495, §2(9) ($50,000) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2292 ($32,500);
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(2) ($20,000).
128 One result of omission of an insurance exemption in the gift tax is that
the question as to what constitutes an insurance policy for death tax exemption
purposes, currently troubling the federal courts, is not presented for gift tax
purposes. See, for instance, Commissioner v. LeGierse, 110 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940), cert. granted 61 Sup. Ct. 32 (1940) ; Tyler v. Commissioner, 111 F.
(2d) 422 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), cert. granted 61 Sup. Ct. 49 (1940) ; Estate of
Keller v. Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940), cert. granted 61
Sup. Ct. 50 (1940); cf. ruling of the Oregon Attorney General, C. C. H. Inh.,
Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 19246. "2 Ore. Laws 1939, c. 148.
120 Succession of Hedden, 146 So. 732 (La. 1932) ; reversing 140 So. 851; and
see the Virginia inheritance tax return form. In Louisiana, the community prop-
erty rules may reduce to one-half the taxability of policies payable to the estate.
See Attorney General's ruling, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv., La.,
1580.
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able to the estate and those payable to others in which the decedent
retained any of the legal incidents of ownership."' These states face
the problem of determining the status of assignments of policies or
designations of beneficiaries which are irrevocable, but under which
the proceeds of the policy would be payable to the insured or his estate
should the beneficiary predecease the insured--i.e., the Hallock case
situation applied to insurance. Should such transfers be taxed under the
gift tax law or the death tax law or both? The problem is shared by
the federal government and California, Minnesota and North Carolina
except to the extent that it might be eliminated if they should finally
reach the position that, because of their all-inclusive death tax regula-
tions and statutes, mentioned above, virtually all insurance transfers
escape the gift tax. Federal cases since the Hallock case (decided with-
out reference to the new regulations) hold that a possibility of reverter
as to insurance renders it subject to death tax;132 and presumably some
of the states, at least, will follow the same rule. Whether this will
prevent gift taxation has not yet been made clear. Logically these cases
should be treated under whatever rules are evolved for the other pos-
sibility of reverter cases, already discussed.
Space does not permit discussion here of the problem of the proper
valuation of an insurance policy at the time of the gift, which has
troubled federal administrative authorities and courts,183 or of the
matter of the gift tax as applied to funded insurance trusts.18' There
is no state litigation ont either point, as yet.
7. Summary
The situations discussed are not the only ones in which gift and
death taxes might apply to the same transfer, but they are among the
more important possibilities, and the inquiry naturally arises as to
whether some consistent rule might be made to apply to all of them.
Such a rule can, and eventually probably will, be applied; but, first,
the policy which is to underlie the rule must be selected.
One possibility, of course, is to follow the idea expressed in the
Sanford case that if a death tax would be levied the gift tax will not
..1 Colo. Laws 1939, c. 118; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1937) §1261a,
amended Laws 1937, c. 129; Wis. STAT. (1935) §72.01, amended Laws 1939, cc,
168, 405, 515.
... Chase National Bank v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) ; Bailey v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 778 (Ct. Cl. 1940), petition for cer-
tiorari dismissed by agreement 60 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1940). See also Broderick v.
Keefe, 112 F. (2d) 293 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), petition for certiorari dismissed by
agreement 60 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1940).
"I U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2, 19; Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 61 Sup. Ct. 507
(1941) ; United States v. Ryerson, 61 Sup. Ct. 479 (1941) ; Powers v. Commis-
sioner, 61 Sup. Ct. 509 (1941).
124 Magill, supra note 4 at 789; Martin Beck, 43 B. T. A., Dec. 20, 1940.
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be; and, as already indicated, authorities in some of the states have
been sufficiently impressed by this idea to give it an extended applica-
tion. Even assuming that liability to death tax can be accurately pre-
dicted in all cases, such a rule is still open to serious criticism. It is
difficult for the writer to believe the legislative intent was to make the
taxes mutually exclusive, or confine their overlap to one small class
of cases, when the legislature has provided: (a) that the gift tax applies
to all transfers by gift; (b) that the death tax applies to enumerated
transfers inter vivos; and (c) that credit shall be allowed on the death
tax for gift tax paid on the same transfer. Had the gift tax preceded
the death tax, it is doubtful if such a construction would ever have been
suggested; though the reverse (i.e., not taxing at death anything already
taxed as a gift) might have been. In fact, such a construction substi-
tutes a part of the history of the tax for its actual provisions. The
other part of tle history of the tax-its relationship to the income tax-
is conveniently forgotten. Further, it assumes that the death tax in
force at the time of the gift will remain in force at the death of the
donor. (This factor is perhaps not currently of great importance, since
the tendency of death tax legislation and construction in recent years
has been to expand the concept of taxable transfers and to increase the
rates of taxation; but should the concept of a taxable transfer be con-
tracted, or rates reduced, then waiving gift taxation in favor of antici-
pated death taxation may prove to have been questionable policy.)
Finally, state authorities may well consider the fact that if, between the
time of the gift and his death, the resident donor of intangibles becomes
a non-resident, the state may receive neither tax; and both state and
federal authorities might consider the effect upon actual total tax col-
lection when the gift is dissipated between the date of the gift and
the death of the donor.
The alternative is to hold that the gift tax applies to all completed
gifts; to define "completed" as meaning placed beyond the power of
the donor to revest the property in himself; and to say that if the
property might revest in the donor upon the happening of some con-
tingency over which he has no control, this fact may affect the value
of the gift but cannot render it incomplete so as to make the transfer
non-taxable. Such a rule would not remove all uncertainties, and the
battleground would most likely be in the field of powers reserved to
the donor in conjunction with others or given to others alone. In the
absence of contrary statutory instructions, the substantial adverse in-
terest theory might offer as good a dividing line here as any other.
The suggested rule would be contrary to the result reached in the
Sanford case, because, as far as the donor is concerned, a transfer of
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the type there involved (reserving only the right to change beneficiaries,
but not to designate the donor or his estate) would be complete under
the suggested definition. However, the argument that this is unfair to
the donee, in that he might be forced to pay tax on a gift that may be
taken away from him, is not overly impressive. In the first place,
realism should compel recognition of the fact that, as payment of the
gift tax out of other funds is one of the advantages conceded to it, the
possibility that it will have to be paid by the donees in cases involving
large sums is remote. For even if the gift must thereafter be included
in gross estate, this does not destroy the conceded advantage, as it will
be included at the value of the property involved in the gift and not
at the value of such property plus the taxes paid on it. In the second
place, the same thing would be true of any gift defeasible upon a con-
tingency, even though the contingency depended in no way upon the
action of the donor. Finally, any hardship could easily be cured by
giving the donee a lien on the gift for any overpayment of tax he might
make.
The other major objection to the suggestion would be that it would
increase the number of cases in which gift and death taxes would, apply
to the same transfer and that, while a credit is provided, it is not satis-
factory. This argument, as applied to federal taxes, is usually grounded
on the fact that the gift tax credit must be deducted before the 80%o
credit for state death taxes is computed, so that in the end total transfer
taxes paid are considerably greater, despite the credit, than they would
be if only the tax at death were involved.35 This does not apply to
state taxes, considered alone; but it must be admitted that if the state
charged a gift tax when the federal government did not, then, even if
credit were later allowed on the state death tax, the total transfer taxes
paid might likewise be greater than if only the death taxes were in-
volved.'3 6 However, these arguments seem to the writer to be directed
against the injustice of situations created by express statutory provi-
sions. The remedy for them, in common with the remedy for many
other problems growing out of complex, expanding and overlapping
' Magill, Federal Regulation of Family Settlements (1937) 4 U. oF CHI. L.
REv. 265; Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1408 (examples given).
... When state and federal death taxes are both levied, it is obvious that any-
thing which operates only to reduce state death taxes will not reduce total taxes
unless the state tax, prior to such reduction, exceeds the' 80% credit for state
death taxes allowed against the federal tax. Any reduction which brings the
state's basic death tax below the 80% credit can result only in: (a) increasing
the federal tax actually payable by decreasing the amount of the credit; or (b)
increasing the additional tax levied by the state to take up the 80% credit. Thus,
if only a state gift tax is levied, and the gift is thereafter included in gross
estate for both federal and state death tax purposes, crediting the state gift tax
against the state death tax will effect an actual saving only to the extent that the
credit applies to any amount by which the state death tax exceeds the 80% credit.
[Vol. 19
STATE GIFT TAXES
tax systems, would seem to be legislative action rather than adminis-
trative or judicial attempts to establish more acceptable policy by de-
parting from the provisions of the statutes. 3 7
As a final word, perhaps many of these problems would be greatly
simplified, if not eliminated, if the gift and death taxes were combined
into one tax in accordance with recent suggestions, under which, in ef-
fect, property still retained by the decedent at death would be taxed as
gifts in the year of death, the rate of the tax being determined by con-
sidering the cumulated gifts for preceding years.' 3 8 Should Congress
decide to attempt such a system, some of the gift tax states would prob-
ably follow the lead, but the prospects of a state pioneering the change
are probably somewhat more remote. Incidentally, such a move by
Congress would almost inevitably require some revision of the 80%
credit, and might well lead to a credit for state gift taxes.
JURISDICTION
Even if space permitted, this writer could add little, if anything, to
the discussion of state jurisdiction to tax which has been the subject of
many articles in recent years. 9 With respect to the theoretical aspects
of the subject, it need be said only that, while it has been urged that
jurisdiction over gifts should be analagous to jurisdiction over sales,' 40
the assumption of the draftsmen of the various gift tax statutes seems
to have been that the gift tax and death tax would be governed by the
same rules. That seems to the writer to be the practical viewpoint.
The only case on the subject is Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Com-
nssion. 41 There a Wisconsin resident went to Chicago, converted in-
tangibles into silver dollars and made a gift in trust of the dollars,
which the trustee thereafter reconverted into intangibles. The Wis-
consin court held this taxable as a gift in Wisconsin. The United States
Supreme Court gave the decision a per curiam affirmance 142 on the
authority of Pearson v. McGraw,14 a death tax case in which a trans-
action virtually ideniical, except that federal reserve notes were used
... In addition to articles cited elsewhere, see the following for discussion of
the relation between death and gift taxes: Chrystie, Death Taxes and Gift Taxes
on Inter Vivos Transfers-Their Correlation (1936) 14 TAx MAG. 716; Merry,
Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Concept of a Transfer (1940) 38 MicH. L. REv.
1032; Nash, Implications of Some Recent Developments in the Taxation of Trusts
(1940) 18 TAxEs 267.
1' Altman, Combining the Gift and Estate Taxes (1938) 16 TAX MAG. 259;
Altman, Integration of the Estate and Gift Taxes (1940) 7 LAW & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 331.
"' See, for instance, articles cited in Merrill, Jurisdicion to Tax-Another
Word (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582 at 582.
140 Cahn, State Gift Tax Jurisdiction (1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 390. But
see note (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 533.
141 235 Wis. 128, 292 N. W. 313 (1940), commented on in (1940) 54 HARv. L.
Ray. 151. 142 61 Sup. Ct. 36 (1940).1'308 U. S. 313, 60 Sup. Ct. 211, 84 L. ed. 293 (1939).
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instead of silver, which also took place in Chicago, was held a gift in
contemplation of death taxable in Oregon, domicile of the decedent.
Subsequently, the Oregon Attorney General has ruled that gifts by the
wife of the taxpayer whose estate figured in the Pearson case, made
under the same circumstances, constituted taxable gifts in Oregon.1 44
If gift tax jurisdiction is to follow the pattern of death tax jurisdic-
tion, then Curry v. McCanless145 means that in some circumstances, at
least (which ones, in all cases, being still undefined), more than one
state will be able 'to tax gifts of intangible property. As to both taxes,
therefore, the same problem is raised as to whether the legislature wilt
attempt to tax to the limit a liberal Court will permit. It would be
expected that the legislatures would renounce or retain their rights as
to both taxes equally, but, whether through inadvertence or otherwise,
such is not always the case.
The gift tax statutes of Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, Virginia and Wisconsin seem broad enough to tax such gifts of
intangibles by nonresidents as they have power to tax, the usual lan-
guage being "within the jurisdiction" or having a "situs" within the
state. 46 (This refers to jurisdiction over or situs of the property, not
the transfer.) Of these states, Louisiana and Virginia seem clearly to
exempt nonresidents' intangibles from death taxes147 and Oregon has
a reciprocal death tax exemption provision. 148 North Carolina has ap-
parently modified the provisions of its laws, by administrative action,
to eliminate taxes on intangibles, not used in business in the state, held
in trust for nonresidents by resident trustees.149 Of the remaining states,
Tennessee exempts nonresidents' intangibles from both taxes,150 Colo-
rado seems to exempt them from gift taxes and certainly exempts them
from death taxes if they are taxed at domicile,151 and California alone
has a reciprocal exemption provision as to both taxes.152 It seems not
"" C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. 9046.
1,5 307 U. S. 357 (1939). The decision permitted both Tennessee and Alabama
to levy death taxes when decedent, domiciled in Tennessee, died 'without having
exercised reserved control powers over a trust of intangibles held by an Alabama
trustee.
"'
6 La. Acts 1940, No. 149, §1; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2394-71;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(156)ee; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935)
§69-1601; VA. CODE; ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAx CODE 120(1); Wis. Laws 1933,
c. 363, §4(1). In Louisiana, if Acts 1940, No. 67, is intended to apply to gift
taxes, as well as to death taxes, then intangibles of non-residents are exempt;
but the wording is far from clear.147 La. Acts 1940, No. 67; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) TAX CovE §98, 120.
" ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §10-605.
14 Letter of Commissioner of Revenue, C. C. H. Inh., Estate and Gift Tax
Serv. 8246. While the letter refers expressly only to intangible property taxes
and death taxes, the same policy would undoubtedly be applied to gift taxes.
I TE:Nx. CODE1 ANN. (Williams, 1937) §1259; Acts 1939, c. 137, §1.
'Colo. Laws 1937, c. 176, §1; Laws 1939, c. 111, §2.
.. Laws 1939, 652, §30, amended Laws 1940, c. 41; Laws 1939, c. 694. How-
ever, the Inheritance Tax Attorney ruled that the death tax law was not broad
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improbable that reciprocal provisions may be expected to multiply, un-
less some more satisfactory method of dealing with the double taxation
problem is evolved, 53 or unless modern legislatures are content to per-
mit the interstate property owner to pay something extra for his cos-
mopolitan interests.
Theoretically the double domicile anomaly can pop up in the gift
tax as well as in the death tax field,' 54 though as a practical matter it
may be more- difficult to establish two domiciles to universal judicial
satisfaction when the peripatetic taxpayer 'is present in person to dis-
tinguish between his penny-wise intentions and his pound-foolish
peregrinations.
Though North Carolina has taken advantage of the decision in
Ma.rwell v. Bugbee' 55 to consider out-of-state property in determining
the rate of death tax applicable to property within the state, 5 6 neither
North Carolina nor any other gift tax state has as yet attempted to
invoke this principle for gift taxes; nor has any state even required
proration of exemptions between gifts taxable within and without the
state.
As one final word, it may be pointed out that a form of double taxa-
tion may result if A, domiciled in, a gift. tax state, makes a taxable
gift of intangibles which, upon his later death domiciled in another state,
is held to be a transfer which must be included in gross estate for death
tax purposes. While cases of this sort may be comparatively rare, leg-
islatures of gift tax states, at least, might consider the possibility of
crediting, on a reciprocal basis, gift taxes paid to other states under
such circumstances. It is hardly to be expected, however, that the states
having no gift taxes could, as yet, be interested in any such provision.
enough to apply to intangibles of residents of other states of the United States,
and hence the 1939 amendment was meaningless as to them. C. C. H. Inh., Estate
and Gift Tax Serv., Calif., 1490.
"' For discussions of reciprocity, see: Brady, Statutory Solutions of Multiple
Death Taxation (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 147; Brady, Death Taxes-Flat Rates and
Reciprocity (1928) 6 NAT. INcOME TAx MAG. 415; Kappes, Double Taxation by
the States (1940) 18 TAxES 15; Orr, Reciprocal Exemptions from Inheritance
Taxation (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rxv. 39. For a summary of the situation as to death
taxes on non-residents' intangibles in all states, see Research Bulletin 46, Federa-
tion of Tax Administrators, March 22, 1940.
... See Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. ed. 763 (1939);
Knapp, Solution of Double Domicile Problems-History and Prospects (1940) 18
TAXES 289; Tannenbaum, Double Domicile (1938) So. CALIF. L. REV. 329;
Tveed and Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain--But What of Domicile?
(1939) 53 HAnv. L. REv. 68.
1" 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 63 L. ed. 1124 (1919). See Lowndes,-Rate and
Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax-Aftermath of Maxwell v. Bughee (1936) 49
HAav. L. Ray. 756.
1"I N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(20).
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